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Assessing the Demographic
Consequences of the Covid-19
Pandemic
Emily Klancher Merchant

Demographers and other social scientists have long recognized that socalled natural disasters are always also social and political. While extreme
weather events, earthquakes, famines, and pandemics may originate in nature, their effects are always structured by existing social inequities and by
political responses. In the Anthropocene—our current geological epoch, in
which biogeochemical change is primarily driven by human activities—it has
become clear that even the origins of such disasters are not entirely natural.
Natural disasters are typically localized in space, usually within countries,
foreclosing the possibility of comparative analysis. As a global pandemic,
however, the Covid-19 event affords demographers an unusual research opportunity. As demographers investigate the demographic consequences of the
pandemic in the regions with which they are most familiar, they should also
collaborate on comparative analysis to determine how social inequities and
political responses in various parts of the world mediated between a global
disease and its local demographic effects.
The Covid-19 pandemic has by now had an unmistakable impact on
each of the core demographic processes—mortality, fertility, and migration—
in all parts of the world. It has also affected the collection of demographic data.
This essay describes some of the demographic consequences in the United
States in order to point to opportunities for comparison with other parts of
the world. To investigate these consequences, demographers will need data
and methods with which to measure the short- and long-term effects of the
Covid-19 pandemic on fertility, mortality, and migration, taking into account
global disease processes, local social structures, and political responses at the
level of public health institutions. (In many countries, this is the national
level, but, in the United States, it has typically been the state or county level.)
Such comparative research will not only help us better understand why Covid-19 had the demographic consequences it had (and will continue to have)
in each part of the world, but may also point to ways we can make societies
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around the world more resilient in the face of future disasters that may not
be individually predictable, but are sure to come in one form or another,
particularly as the pace of climate change increases.

Mortality
Perhaps the most obvious demographic consequence of the Covid-19 pandemic has been an increase in mortality, both from the disease caused by
the SARS-COV2 virus and from the secondary effects of the virus on health
systems and economies. According to the Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center, more than 1.8 million people worldwide have died
from Covid-19 at the time of this writing, with over 350,000 deaths—approximately 19 percent of the total—occurring in the United States. While
the early rhetoric surrounding Covid-19 maintained that the disease does not
discriminate, it quickly became clear that not everyone is equally susceptible.
People who are unable to isolate are at greater risk of contracting the disease,
while those who are older or carry a heavier burden of preexisting conditions and comorbidities are less likely to survive it. In the United States, these
categories intersect with one another and with the categories that structure
social inequality, in this case race and socioeconomic status. Poor and nonwhite Americans are less likely to be able to isolate—due to service-sector
and factory jobs, jobs that do not offer paid (or sometimes even unpaid) sick
time, and household crowding—and are more likely to carry comorbidities
as a result of living in food deserts, the inequitable siting of environmental
hazards, and stark inequalities in access to health care. In other countries,
different histories of social inequality will likely structure mortality in different ways. Also critical is the public health response to the pandemic, which
was abrupt and highly effective in many parts of Asia (including Australia
and New Zealand), somewhat less so in Europe, and truly deplorable in the
United States and some parts of Latin America. Comparative research on the
short- and long-term mortality consequences of Covid-19 will need to tease
the effects of the disease itself apart from the underlying social conditions that
made some people more susceptible to it and from the political and public
health response.

Fertility
In contrast to the mortality consequences of Covid-19, which became apparent very early on and have been diligently tracked by a number of agencies,
it may take several years to fully understand and account for the fertility
consequences. These studies, too, will need to examine the results of the
disease itself, such as the potential effects of Covid-19 on sperm production;
underlying social inequities, such as existing risks of maternal and perinatal
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mortality, which may have been exacerbated by the pandemic; and policy
responses that may shape future childbearing decisions through the distribution of the burden of childcare. In the United States, the immediate effects
of Covid-19 on fertility operated through those who were pregnant when
the pandemic began and those who were in the process of trying to conceive
with the help of various assisted reproductive technologies (ART). Among
those who were pregnant when the pandemic began, the same women who
already face higher risks of maternal and perinatal mortality—poor women
and especially black women and Latinas—also faced a higher risk of contracting Covid-19. Those who were trying to conceive using ART had to pause
this process while health systems retooled to focus on treating Covid-19. As
the pandemic wore on, however, fertility clinics reopened, and many people
renewed their efforts to conceive.
In the long run, policy responses to the pandemic will also affect fertility through the future childbearing decisions of individuals and couples. In
the United States, the pandemic demonstrated that, even at the best of times,
most families get by only through a delicate balancing act, piecing together
the inadequate and largely unregulated childcare resources that are available
to those who can afford them. When the pandemic shut down schools and
day care centers in March, it was largely mothers who put their careers on
hold to take care of young children and to help older children navigate their
classes on Zoom. This is not a natural response to the pandemic, but rather
one overdetermined by a long history of gender discrimination in the labor
force and an absence of policies to support working mothers and dual-career
families. Indeed, the same factors that have kept fertility lower in countries
like Italy and Japan, where mothers are primarily responsible for childcare,
than in countries like Sweden, where there is more public support for dualcareer families, will also determine the long-term fertility consequences of
Covid-19.

Migration
The migration consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic will also need to be
evaluated in both the short- and long-term. When it became clear that the
SARS-COV2 virus was going to cause a pandemic, countries around the world
began to limit travel and close borders. As a result, many international sojourners returned to their countries of origin, while others decided to remain
abroad for the duration. An unexpected consequence was that, as workers
abroad were prevented from returning home due to travel restrictions, the
migrant smuggling business developed a sideline of smuggling people back
home. As universities scrambled to shift classes online, many also closed their
dormitories, sending students home to various parts of the world. These relocations are likely to be relatively short-lived. Most universities and college
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students are anxiously awaiting a return to campus life, and restrictions on
travel will undoubtedly ease when a vaccine or effective treatments become
available. The increase in remote work, however, may have a longer-term
impact on migration. Now that it has become apparent that many jobs can be
done remotely, some large employers have begun to reevaluate their workfrom-home or telecommuting policies, and smaller employers are likely to
follow suit. An increase in opportunities to work remotely will also afford
some people—those with jobs that can be done remotely—a broader set of
choices over where to live that could dramatically reshape social geographies.
An impressive number of countries, ranging from Antigua to Georgia, are
offering one-year renewable remote work visas to “digital nomads” who can
demonstrate income and health insurance and afford to pay a fairly modest
fee. Demographers will need to investigate the determinants of migration
when some people are no longer geographically bound by their jobs, and
should examine how the extreme mobility of some workers—typically those
with jobs that pay more and offer better benefits—affects the fortunes of immobile workers, such as those in service industries that rely on proximity to
their clientele. As with mortality and fertility, the migration consequences of
the Covid-19 pandemic and the shift to remote work will be shaped primarily
by underlying social structures and public policies.

Demographic Data
In addition to its effects on mortality, fertility, and migration rates and patterns, the Covid-19 pandemic has also had consequences for the collection of
demographic data. This has been most apparent in the United States, where
the in-person enumeration of households that did not return their 2020
Census form by mail or respond online was first delayed by the pandemic
and then curtailed prematurely by the Trump administration, likely leading
to an unnecessarily high rate of undercounting. Under ordinary circumstances, it is relatively straightforward for demographers to determine who
was missed by a census. However, the enormous demographic upheavals
generated by the Covid-19 pandemic will likely make this task more difficult. One particular challenge stems from the fact that many of the people
who are most vulnerable to undercounting—the poor and non-White, as
well as non-English-speakers—are also particularly vulnerable to Covid-19
mortality. Another stems from the fact that most U.S. universities closed in
March, scattering students across the country and the world right before the
Census. The American media has paid particular attention to the 2020 U.S.
Census because of the controversies that had already surrounded it—most
notably the citizenship question—and because of the political consequences
of undercounting. However, the United States is not alone in the impact the
Covid-19 pandemic has had on its census. Since 1950, the United Nations has
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encouraged all countries of the world to take censuses in or near years ending
in zero, so many countries have had to manage enumeration in the midst
of the pandemic. While a few countries—such as Mexico and Mongolia—
completed their data collection early in the year, most have had to suspend
or delay enumeration, or substitute data from population registers or other
administrative records. The pandemic will, therefore, have a larger effect on
demographic data collection in countries that lack adequate administrative
records and communication infrastructures that would facilitate enumeration
by mail, telephone, or Internet rather than in person.
As a global pandemic unfolding simultaneously across the world, the
Covid-19 episode affords unique opportunities for comparative research on all
of the basic demographic processes. Such research may be able to determine
the specific contributions of the disease itself, underlying social inequities,
and policy responses to changes in mortality, fertility, migration, and censustaking. Understanding these natural, social, and political factors will be critical
to evaluating vulnerability to future natural (and not-so-natural) disasters,
and to promoting resilience.

